(1) Fundamental research, (2) comparisons and rule constructions (3) public policy recommendations
A migration policy that is said to be suitable to guarantee the effective management of the migratory phenomenon must therefore necessarily stimulate dialogue and cooperation between the countries of origin, transit and destination, in order to find common solutions for every question connected to it, is valid to say improve border controls, ensure international protection, combat irregular immigration and make the most of the positive effects of regular migration. The effort of this project aims to become a reasoned model of integration, cohesion and social interaction
To implement the work program and achieve the objectives, we will use the above described methodological concepts to direct our effort. To this end, there are three components of our research plan, comparisons and public policy recommendations related to forecasts.
Such a vast and complex topic requires a set of procedures developed to group data, to measure complex and not directly observable concepts. We would prefer to use a coherent and organic set of indicators, also developing inter-subjective criteria to control the actual overlap between indicators and concept and the completeness of the procedure.
First pillar of this proposal is the demystification of African migration, through a careful investigation and empirical discoveries that aim to highlight the enormous distance between the realities of African migration and the perceptions of both public opinion and policy makers. We will try to demonstrate with rational and evident data that African migration is not increasing and mainly oriented to the North, since most African migrants migrate to Africa. The various migration flows will be followed to verify how the emigration phenomenon from the poorest regions, in particular, is mainly oriented towards destinations within the African continent. It will then be highlighted how emigration from Africa is higher from the North Africa region, where countries have relatively higher levels of human and economic development. We will investigate whether better infrastructure, higher income, better education and access to information increase the likelihood of people migrating, and whether this phenomenon continues in the future. Particular attention will be paid to smuggling and whether these are the cause of migration from Africa to Europe or, rather, the consequence of more restrictive migration policies. Furthermore, it is not clear that further controls on immigration lead to less migration, as policy makers think, even if the comparison will have to provide more definitive elements, not excluding the probability that migration policies generate unwanted effects. All this will be the subject of particular investigation. Research should better understand migratory “behaviors” and the choices of African migrants. The following points relating to restrictive migration policies implemented by European countries will be taken into consideration:
1. Choice of destination. Migrants choose to migrate to other destination countries rather than their former colonizing nation when this country has implemented restrictive migration policies, especially if they cannot migrate through family reunification or have had difficulty integrating into other destination countries.
2. Paths. Migrants remain in the transit countries before reaching Europe when the migration policies that regulate access to Europe become more restrictive, in particular those that are poorly qualified (and therefore less likely to obtain a visa) and who cannot migrate through family reunification.
3. Channel. Migrants pay smugglers, use false documents to facilitate their migration and apply for asylum when policies controlling migrants’ access to destination countries become more restrictive.
4. Intention to go back in time. Migrants are less likely to return after migration to Europe if they know that entry policies in Europe have become restrictive because they know it will be difficult to migrate again. This is particularly true for those who have had difficulty migrating or not being documented.
5. Circulation. Migrants have fewer opportunities to go back and forth when entry and residence policies are more restrictive, especially those who have no documents, have short-term residence permits or limited rights to work in the country of destination, as movement requires capital financial and freedom of movement.
Second pillar is rappresented by the method with which to build a model so that the result is usable and suitable for building policies that cannot be shared only by the various EU countries. but that live up to the history of Europe, its cultural, scientific and humanitarian project, in which every citizen can recognize himself. Extensive use will be made of social, mathematical, anthropological, statistical, economic, etc. sciences, and all procedures will be widely documented, reliable and verifiable. Likewise, the rigorous, logical-rational analysis that will be adopted, providing the necessary demonstrations, will be verifiable. The documents that will be the source / object of the research and analysis are all official documents of public organizations, but non-governmental and private sources will also be used: the reliability and rigor adopted in the research will be verified for all. Maximum transparency will be adopted in the decoding devices of the documentary material that will be acquired. Next to it, research will be carried out at every possible source of knowledge: ministries which in various capacities deal with migration, port authorities, embassies, NGOs, study centers, private associations, ecclesiastics, etc. Ultimately any organization involved in the phenomenon of migration that provides adequate reliability.
Third pillar aims at understanding migratory flows lies in the reasons and analysis of
comparative demography African population growth is recent, and has been rapid:
it is estimated that in the period 2000-2007 the population grew at an average
annual rate of 2 , 5%, over double the world average (World bank 2009b); in the
following period it increased to 3%. According to United Nations estimates,
growth has had this trend: from almost 675 million inhabitants in 2000 to over
863 in 2010, up to nearly 1 billion in 2015 which will reach almost 1.2 billion
in 2025. The most relevant figure of this rapid population growth is made up of
the high percentage of very young people who, in the age range from 0 to 14
years, touch 50% of the inhabitants, against a world average abundantly below
30%. All this despite the low life expectancy at birth (around 50 years in
2006), which gives a generous proportion between the complex of young people
and elderly people of non-working age, on the one hand, and the adult
population in the active age, from the ‘else. The diversity that distinguishes
the various states is nonetheless remarkable: some are small both by population
and by surface, such as Swaziland and Lesotho (17,364 km2 and 1,123,000 inhab.
And 30,355 km2 and 2,130,000 inhab., 2009 respectively) ; others are very
different from each other in terms of number of inhabitants and territory and
there is talk of states with relatively small populations compared to their
large size, such as Mozambique (21 million inhabitants, 801,590 km2); other
states are both populous and extensive, such as Nigeria (148 million
inhabitants, 923,768 km2) and states of such a wide extent as to make control
of the territory difficult, in particular the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(2,345,410 km 2, 62 million inhabitants). The low population density, long-term
constant in African history, is accentuated by the tragic tribute imposed by
the slave trade between the beginning of the 16th and the middle of the 19th
century, both on the Atlantic route and on the eastern routes that supplied the
Muslim world. This territory / population structure must be integrated with
economic data. To make a clear, clear and immediate perception of the income of
the whole sub-Saharan Africa, it is enough to refer to a comparison often
mentioned that estimated at about 762 billion dollars, a value slightly higher
than that of the Netherlands (about 750 billion), which have a population 50
times smaller (World bank). In the world-wide classification by income
brackets, none of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa were included in the
high-income group (World bank). Only 6 countries (Botswana, Gabon, Mauritius,
Mayotte, Seychelles, South Africa) were in the high-end middle-income group,
and 8 others (Angola, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Republic of the Congo, Lesotho,
Namibia, Sudan, Swaziland) in low-income middle-income group. The low-income
group included the remaining 33 of 47 sub-Saharan African countries. In
essence, very few states in this region have a per capita income that allows,
in conditions of income distribution not too unbalanced, to relieve the
population from conditions of serious and widespread poverty. So the reasoning
that must unfold cannot be separated from the consideration of a sub-Saharan
Africa called to face the challenge of growth with investments in physical and
human capital, and substantial increases in productivity to support wider
production flows, an indispensable condition ile to improve consumption widely and to cope with the
increase in population.
Africa Current population by age and sex for 2019-03-03 *
|0-4||100 880 501||⇐+3%||97 928 326|
|5-9||89 141 853||⇐+3%||86 505 878|
|10-14||77 260 056||⇐+2.3%||75 500 914|
|15-19||66 998 270||⇐+2.6%||65 314 346|
|20-24||58 273 259||⇐+2.3%||56 983 397|
|25-29||51 494 171||⇐+1.2%||50 901 711|
|30-34||45 031 197||+0.2%⇒||45 106 574|
|35-39||37 463 733||+1.2%⇒||37 912 166|
|40-44||30 077 449||+1.1%⇒||30 415 075|
|45-49||23 969 002||+2%⇒||24 452 720|
|50-54||19 538 835||+3.5%⇒||20 215 023|
|55-59||15 762 887||+6.7%⇒||16 817 104|
|60-64||12 110 965||+10.9%⇒||13 426 967|
|65-69||8 755 117||+15.4%⇒||10 104 306|
|70-74||5 765 883||+21.7%⇒||7 019 814|
|75-79||3 472 256||+27.9%⇒||4 439 800|
|80-84||1 854 567||+34.3%⇒||2 491 215|
|85-89||790 867||+43.4%⇒||1 134 132|
|90-94||229 258||+57.8%⇒||361 702|
|95-99||25 002||+80.3%⇒||45 076|
|100+||1 739||+130.2%⇒||4 003|
 United Nations, Department
of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2015). World Population
Prospects: The 2015 Revision. Data are estimated and projections according to a
medium fertility variant. Reused with United Nations permission. Downloaded:
The fourth pillar is represented by the study of the Sub-Saharan economy. Sub-Saharan Africa is home to a large part of the world population in conditions of extreme poverty (with severe difficulties of access to essential goods and living conditions of the contemporary era), and since among the great regions of the world it has the highest percentage of poor, is a priority area for development aid provided by the vast international bureaucratic machine. Aid to date has not been lacking in the form of cancellation of debts, subsidized credits or donations, it comes from multilateral institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, FAO or the United Nations Development Agency, as well as from individual states, flanked by the widespread presence of non-governmental organizations and foundations. In more recent times foreign direct investments have taken place while the presence of China, India and Brazil is growing, which are a novelty in that economic landscape. But this is not enough to move the reasons for a persistent depressed economy. A simple comparison explains the miserable conditions: in 2007, the income of the entire sub-Saharan Africa was estimated at about 762 billion dollars, a value slightly higher than that of the Netherlands (about 750 billion), which have a population 50 times smaller (World bank 2009b,). In the world-wide classification by income brackets, in 2007 none of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa were included in the high-income group (World bank 2009b,). Only 6 countries (Botswana, Gabon, Mauritius, Mayotte, Seychelles, South Africa) were in the high-end middle-income group, and another 8 (Angola, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Namibia, Sudan, Swaziland) in low-income middle-income group. The low income produced is in the majority of cases the first, heavy constraint on improving the living conditions of citizens. In the collective imagination, sub-Saharan Africa often appears to be marked by misery, conflicts or the incidence of the AIDS epidemic, with the high mortality due to it. It is also perceived as a residual space of intact nature and of ‘tradition’, while in developed countries, non-populated environments are restricted and the approval of local cultures is feared. The economies of sub-Saharan Africa generate income primarily in three sectors: energy and mineral resources, agriculture (commercial, subsistence or small independent farmers) and services (with an important weight of the public sector). According to World Bank estimates, in 2007 agriculture generated around 15% of the added value produced in the region, industry (including mining and energy) around 32%, services around 54% (World bank 2009b, ). The countries of sub-Saharan Africa, with limited exceptions, have not developed that manufacturing specialization for exports that has driven the growth of the countries of Southeast Asia, China and India. They have remained marginal in the process of globalization, and find it difficult to find in the new international division of labor a role different from that which they played in the colonial order, as producers of agricultural (cotton, coffee etc.) or mining (gold, diamonds) raw materials . Recent news gives Marrocco the possibility of overcoming South Africa as a car manufacturer and, in the near future, Italy’s production also seems to be outdated. The panorama of sub-Saharan Africa is dominated by two very large economies in relation to its global income, Nigeria and South Africa, which together contributed 54% to the region’s income in 2007 (respectively 18% and 36%; World bank 2009b,), while their citizens represented almost a quarter of its population. Nigeria, a very populous country, generates income both for its size and for its oil revenues; but his per capita income in 2007 was only $ 930, just in line with the area average. Countries without access to the sea are disadvantaged in accessing international markets also for economic and political reasons. They are countries with low density of economic activity, with an environment that is not conducive to entrepreneurial initiatives, with high costs due to inadequate and fragile infrastructures, and with additional costs, in international trade, due to the long bureaucratic time needed to carry out the passage of goods at the borders. African economies, and not only the more fragile ones, are exposed to the loss of value of their oil and mining exports, to the contraction of foreign direct investments due to the international liquidity crisis, to the decline in the tourist market or in the demand for primary products. In the short term, they also suffer the risk of the reduction in aid flows, for the inevitably smaller financial resources in donor countries.
The fifth pillar will analyze European demography and the trends that are looming in the near future. The current data tell us that by 2050, with the exception of the United Kingdom, France, Sweden, Norway and Ireland, if the doors of emigration were to remain closed in Europe there would be a demographic decrease estimated from 10 to 12%, therefore we will have a continent with 60/70 million less inhabitants. A non-traumatic decrease at first sight in particular if you think that a stasis in demography could also have positive effects. Europe is a continent densely settled by humans who leave deep traces on the environment, for the energy they consume, the primary resources they transform, the artifacts and infrastructures they build, the pollution they produce. Looking at the stagnation period between 1980 and 2015, 7% of population growth can be broken down into -22% for the population under 30 years of age, + 21% for those between 30 and 60 years of age, and + 58% for that with more than 60 years. The effort is to efficiently and effectively cope with the statistical requirements necessary for the production of information on the consistency, structure and dynamics of the population, including the migrant population. Creating circularity and sharing information between the data of the survey institutes that contribute to the production of official population statistical data, a prerequisite for a correct system of relations between national and community level based on the transparency of statistical procedures and methodologies. During the execution of the project, various professionals will have to deal with:
• permanent and technologically assisted interactivity in communication between the various national Statistics Offices and Eurostat, regarding all phases of the population statistics production process, both with regard to regulatory and procedural aspects, and to technical and technological ones;
• promotion and assistance of population statistical data acquisition processes;
• standardization of the monitoring, control and evaluation processes of the coverage and quality of the surveys;
• training for sharing tools to accompany activities aimed at collecting demographic data and enhancing human capital.
The sixth pillar will examine European welfare in detail. Making international comparisons requires that the data under consideration be comparable. The preferred source for social spending will be Eurostat, identified in accordance with the criteria adopted in the ESSPROS (European System of Integrated Social Protection Statistics), which classifies social protection expenditure according to the various risks (disease, old age, disability, survivors , unemployment, family, social exclusion, housing). This criterion will be adopted for all the statistical institutes of the EU countries. and, if necessary, also from countries outside the U.E. The focus will be on the load of solidarity that weighs on the EU countries. load that if it becomes too burdensome due to an economic crisis or the progressive aging of the population, it could be necessary to drastically dismantle social benefits on the model of historical immigration countries.
According to OECD data, in 2012 German spending on welfare was equivalent to 29.6% of GDP, two percentage points above the average of the eight countries covered by the Prowelfare research (27.6%). The same is true for public health expenditure (8.6% in Germany, against 7.4% of the average) and for professional training (0.4% against 0.1%) while expenditure for family-work balance it is lower than the average (2.1% against 2.4%).
We will see as a reference the
German welfare state which not only deserves careful study, but above all will
have a reference value for the remaining EU countries. To simplify in 2015, it
was hoped that asylum seekers would be quickly integrated into the German labor
market, so as not to weigh more on the welfare state. Thus began a recognition
of their level of education, in order to be able to better assess their
placement. The current forecasts are far less optimistic than then: the bulk of
the refugees have little specialization or have unsolicited qualifications,
with the consequence of weighing for years on public budgets (federal and
state). The undeniable and growing rift within a society that has seen a
massive influx of people from different cultural realities could call into
question the keeping of the social pact.
International comparisons are also affected by the type of instrument chosen by the various countries to face various types of social risk (for example, poverty or unemployment of older workers). Always to simplify, historically, due to structural limits of the welfare system, Italy has resorted to the pension system (also through early retirements) to meet welfare and employment needs. On the other hand, other countries (especially in Northern Europe), in the event of an early exit from the activity, provide generous disability or unemployment benefits, which are not accounted for in social security expenditure, although they perform a function completely similar to old-age pensions. The various divergences between States will be studied: for example Italy is characterized by an older population than other EU partners. However, in the “Old age” item of Esspros (the one on which the comparisons between countries are based), in addition to social pensions and other subsidies (4.3% of the total expenditure), are also included the payments for treatment of private and public severance pay (TFR and TFS, an Italian peculiarity), which in 2011 amounted to 11.6% of total expenditure. As is known, these disbursements constitute a form of deferred wages and not a social security measure to protect the risk of old age; in fact, they are available at any time the contractual relationship is interrupted (even well before retirement) and can be anticipated in the presence of specific needs of the worker (medical costs and purchase of the first home). Welfare is not an act of charity, but an incentive to social peace, in order to reduce conflicts, in the name of equality of opportunity. It is public support for the younger generations and is functional to mutual assistance mechanisms to avoid a continuous reproduction of the intergenerational conflict. In the absence of the current welfare state, many young adults would suffer from a lack of economic emancipation and a more difficult personal emancipation.
Multiculturalism, separation, integration, interaction
The main purpose of this project is to analyze, study and understand the factors of migration, but also to explore its future, to build projections and scenarios indispensable for producing and governing changes, reforms.
This means outlining a suitable policy to guarantee effective management of the migration phenomenon. A complex issue that must necessarily stimulate dialogue and cooperation between the countries of origin, transit and destination, in order to find common solutions for each related issue, i.e. improve border controls, guarantee international protection, counteract irregular immigration and make the most of the positive effects induced by regular immigration. But all this is not enough. It is necessary to think of reasoned radical changes, adequate planning and effective policy development. One of the fundamental problems is the formation of a society with multiple cultures, in the full sense of the word. This is a problem that underlies all the other problems of our time and the one to come in which the co-presence has so far created separation in the places of life, neighborhoods, types of work, schools, etc. with careful behavior to avoid the dangers of contamination or contagion, against which the community must defend itself. It has been argued and still argues that separation is the only way to avoid the clash between irreconcilable realities. It would serve to avoid what is called the “clash of civilizations” in one’s own home. History has already been concerned with providing us with the “separate but equal” model with its obvious limitations. It happens that when one side is socially, economically, culturally and politically stronger than the other, separation becomes discriminatory. Integration, as opposed to separation, aims at homogeneous society, in which cultural differences subside until they disappear. However, integration has a dynamic that sees a culture that integrates and one that is integrated, that is, to an asymmetry between one, more vital and the other less. Integrationism is inexorably the ideology of the dominant culture. If he is dominant, sooner or later he will want to exercise his dominion and, inexorably, he will thus manifest his true nature which is to assimilate the other. Naturally this dynamic presupposes the superiority of one culture over the others; it is a mild version of cultural racism that justifies the claim to engulf recessive cultures or, at the most, to let them survive as folklore, as a show. This is not always the case. It also happens that, if the different culture “cannot be integrated”, the homogeneous society feels authorized to practice policies of segregation or oppression. Integrationism tends to mitigate first, and then cancel, the identity aspects of different cultures. In short, integration is the watchword of culturally homogeneous organic communities. Can we be against communities when we talk about others and not when we talk about ourselves? The interaction remains, whose validity rests on the need and ability of cultures to enter into relationships, to define themselves, as well as defend themselves from assimilation, but also on the willingness to build together and, possibly, to learn from each other . Here there is a need not to confuse these attitudes with simple tolerance. Each party must recognize the others as a counterpart in a relationship oriented to the search for the right solutions to the problems of coexistence, without requiring a priori renunciations of its ideals and values. It is unthinkable that immigrants, as individuals, are able to enter into a relationship of reciprocity, even if only vaguely respectful of a balance with the target society. For this reason, the imposition of individualistic rules, typical of western societies, towards those who come to us from community ways of life appear inappropriate. We must avoid unhinging social ties and cultural comforts, solutions that may seem to us a liberation, but for them it is certainly violence. And this interaction cannot be separated from the involvement of migrants and migrant and refugee researchers from backgrounds with an entirely different cultural background. The interaction, on the other hand, while starting from the recognition of diversity, or rather enhancing it as an element of potential common wealth, is open to evolution and mutual influences, in view of a common human horizon. The interaction is not universalistic from the start, but it can become so in perspective. And it would be a non-aggressive, open, comprehensive, plural universalism, an enemy of identities brandished as weapons of war. In substance, the colonialist and imperialist perspective, which also makes use of cultural means, which the West has carried within itself as a germ for at least a couple of centuries, would disappear. The interaction is potentially rich in all the contents of coexistence: mutual respect, openness, curiosity for diversity, spirit of equality and welcome, warm brotherhood in the difficulties of the human condition. And it is the reality that you touch with your hand in attending any of the communities or associations that deal with hospitality. We could also observe our life with different eyes, from sides hitherto obscured by habit.
The expected impacts of our project align directly with our objectives to tackle the problem of immigration and to understand the drama south of the Mediterranean where misery, armed conflicts, illegal trafficking, epidemics and famines are concentrated. Identify the causes of the resistance of many European countries to welcome African migrants. Analysis of the benefits for the communities involved and improving government approaches and responses to interpersonal relationships between migrants and natives.
Impact 1. Our research on migrant flows will create new knowledge for administrative structures, sociologists, political scientists, educators, politicians, but also for the public. These results will be widely disseminated in academic journals, the popular press and policy reports.
Impact 1.1. Our social-economic-political indicators used to quantitatively and qualitatively measure the phenomenon of migratory flow and historical reasons and the study of the different methods and procedures adopted so far for asylum seekers, can be used by other scholars and policy makers as a new index to standardize the reception of migrants.
Stage 1.2.Our systematic research methodology will allow us to know in detail the drama of many African countries and to mobilize resources to stem the pauperism for which, in certain periods, large sections of the population African women are affected by misery. Stimulate modest levels of well-being sufficient to mitigate the motivations that induce migration.
Stage 2 Resolve the ambiguous status of the migrant, at the same time a victim worthy of protection and subject liable to coercive-punitive reaction. The same ambiguity is inevitably reflected also on the status of the rescuers, exposed to the risk of a charge of aiding and abetting.
Stage2.1. Our specific public policy recommendations, based on new research and methods, will encourage community socialization, cultural appreciation, economic relations and political involvement